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QSA WW1 Group RFA Wounded Boer War

QSA, 5 bars, Talana, Defence of Ladysmith, KSA, 2 bars, WW1 Pair, 90373 Driver Alfred Oxlade, 13th Battery Royal Field Artillery, wounded in action Farquhar’s Farm, 30th Oct 1899 during the Ladysmith campaign.

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Origin: United Kingdom
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Queen’s South Africa, 5 bars, Talana, Defence of Ladysmith, Orange Free State, Transvaal, Laing’s Nek, King’s South Africa, 2 bars, SA 1901, SA 1902, British War and Victory Medal, 90373 Driver Alfred Oxlade, 13th Battery Royal Field Artillery, wounded in action Farquhar’s Farm, 30th Oct 1899 during the Ladysmith campaign. 

 

QSA officially impressed: “90373 Dvr A. Oxlade., 13/Bty R.F.A.”

KSA officially impressed: “90372 Dvr A. Oxlade. R.F.A” Earned with 21st Battery, service number matches medal roll exactly, last digit should be 3 but medal was named matching to the roll given.

WW1 Pair officially impressed: “155786 Dvr A. Oxlade. R.A.”

 

All confirmed on the medal rolls.

 

With copy service papers.

 

During the Boer War, just after having fought at the Battle of Talana on 20th October 1899, Driver Oxlade was wounded in action “At Farquhar’s Farm, near Nicholson’s Nek, Ladysmith on October 30th 1899”. This battle is known as the “Battle of Ladysmith” or Nicholson’s Nek.

 

Oxlade was one of 9 wounded, including his Battery Sergt Major J Garner who died of his wounds the next day.

 

During the battle Captain John Norwood of the 5th Dragoon Guards won the Victoria Cross.

 

Angloboerwar.com provides the following insightful summary of the battle on their informative page of the 1st Battalion Liverpool Regiment, regarding the 13th Battery who assisted Grimwood’s Brigade during the battle when Oxlade was wounded.

 

https://www.angloboerwar.com/unit-information/imperial-units/570-kings-liverpool-regiment

 

“On the three following days the Boers concentrated to the north of Ladysmith, and on the 29th General White resolved to again take the offensive next day. The action is variously known as Lombard’s Kop, Farquhar’s Farm, Nicholson’s Nek, and Ladysmith. The last name seems the most appropriate. To reconcile the different accounts of this battle written by men who were on the field is an impossible task. For example, the account of Mr Bennet Burleigh differs on many most important points from that of ‘The Times’ historian. For the main features the official despatch must be relied on. Briefly, General White’s scheme was to take the Boer positions, Long Hill and Pepworth Hill, north of Ladysmith; to throw forward part of his cavalry between and beyond Lombard’s Kop and Bulwana on the north-east to protect his right flank, and to seize Nicholson’s Nek, or a position near it, on the north-west, from which the rest of his cavalry could operate in the event of a Boer retreat.

 

At 11 pm on the 29th the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1st Gloucesters, and 10th Mountain Battery marched off towards Nicholson’s Nek. At a hill called Cainguba some stones were rolled down from above; there was a momentary confusion, during which the mules carrying the mountain guns and ammunition stampeded. Some of the infantry charged and took the hill without difficulty. “The officer in command then ordered the remainder of the force up the hill, and some stone works were set up in the darkness; but when daylight appeared it was seen that the perimeter was such as to make the task of holding the top one of difficulty. In the morning the Boers massed round the hill, ascended its steep sides, and firing from the rocks round the edge of the top, soon did much damage. At 12.30 a white flag, unauthorised by any of the senior officers, was put up at an outlying sangar and the Boers flocked in. The flag was indorsed by those in chief command, and the whole force surrendered. This, of course, was not known to Sir George till late on the 30th, although from men and mule-drivers who had come back into Ladysmith in the morning he knew that his operations on the left were foredoomed to failure, if not to disaster. Strange it is that British troops have so often been unfortunate in their experience of holding hill-tops in South Africa. After dark on the 29th the Natal Mounted Volunteers seized Lombard’s Kop and Bulwana. At 3 am on the 30th Major General French moved out with the 5th Lancers, the 19th Hussars, and some Natal Volunteers; but at daybreak he found that he could not get much farther than the exit of the pass between the two last-mentioned hills; indeed by 8 am he could barely hold his position, and was thus of little use in protecting the right of the main attack.

 

West of French’s cavalry was what was intended to be the main attacking force under Colonel Grimwood, to consist of the 1st Liverpool, 1st Leicester, 1st and 2nd King’s Royal Rifles, and 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, with the 21st, 42nd, and 53rd Batteries RFA and the Natal Field Battery. By some unfortunate bungling or confusion of orders the artillery intended for Colonel Grimwood did not accompany him, but branched off, taking along with them the Liverpools, Dublin Fusiliers, and two companies of the Mounted Infantry.

 

West of Grimwood was Colonel Ian Hamilton with the 1st Devon, 1st Manchester, 2nd Gordons, and 2nd Rifle Brigade. The latter battalion had arrived in Ladysmith at 3 am that morning, and only joined the rest of the brigade on the field at 6.30. With Hamilton the 13th, 67th, and 69th Batteries RFA were intended to be.

 

The original scheme of the action involved that Colonel Grimwood’s brigade would turn half-left and work inwards to Pepworth Hill, but at an early hour he was very heavily attacked from his right front and right flank. Accordingly he had to turn in that direction, extend his front greatly, throw his whole people into the firing line, and when that was done he had the greatest difficulty in maintaining his position even after the 21st and 53rd Batteries came to his support. About 8 am General White sent the 5th Dragoon Guards and 18th Hussars and the 69th and afterwards the 21st Batteries to assist French, the 13th and 53rd Batteries supporting Grimwood. At 10 am the Manchesters were taken from Hamilton and were also sent to support Grimwood. Even with this diversion of force to the right he could gain nothing. “This condition of affairs continued until 11.30 am, when, finding that there was little prospect of bringing the engagement to a decisive issue, I determined to withdraw my troops”. The 2nd Rifle Brigade lined the crest of Limit Hill, facing east. The 2nd Gordons took up a similar position. Sir George’s words are: “I sent Major General Sir A Hunter, KCB, my chief of staff, to arrange a retirement in echelon from the left, covered by the fire of our artillery. This was most successfully carried out, the artillery advancing in the most gallant manner and covering the infantry movement with the greatest skill and coolness”. That the artillery did magnificently is beyond doubt. They had to work in the open exposed to very heavy shell-fire, and but for the heroic services of the 13th, 21st, 53rd, and 69th Batteries, Grimwood’s infantry and French’s cavalry would have had much greater difficulty in withdrawing. Unfortunately unofficial accounts do not praise the infantry of Colonel Grimwood’s command, and it has been said that the retirement was not orderly. ‘The Times’ historian is indeed mercilessly severe on that officer and certain of the regiments in his command. Whether that severity is warranted it is outside the scope of this work to discuss; but it must be borne in mind that some of the troops were still worn out with the march from Dundee—and further, at Talana Hill they had lost very many officers. The 1st King’s Royal Rifles, for example, had lost their colonel and 4 officers killed and 6 wounded.

 

In his evidence before the War Commission Sir Archibald Hunter, who was chief of Sir George White’s staff, said: “We withdrew, and in a very orderly way. The artillery covered our withdrawal, and the long lines of infantry simply marched back; it was like a field-day”.

 

No account of the battle of 30th October could possibly omit the value of the services of the Naval Brigade, who arrived in Ladysmith by train that morning, and with characteristic expedition got their guns into action against the heavy artillery of the Boers.”

 

 

 

Alfred Oxlade, was born in St Lukes, London, Middlesex circa 1874.

 

Enlisted aged 18 working as a Labourer, and having been a serving member of the 3rd Bn Royal Fusiliers on 18th May 1892.

 

He saw the following service over 12 years.

“Home, 18th may 1892 – 15th May 1897

South Africa, 16th May 1897 – 12th Oct 1902

Home, 13th October 1902 – 17th May 1904.”

 

Naturally the old veteran joined back up with the Royal Artillery to earn these two medal only.

 

He attested on 19th August 1916, rather craftily he stated he was 39 years old and 3 months, when he was about 42, just nudging him under 40.

Stating he had already served 12 years in the RFA, leaving back in 1902.

 

Embarked from UK on 23rd Jan 1917

Disembarked in Salonica, 3rd Feb 1917.

 

Admitted to hospital on 21st Feb 1917, then to Hospital Ship Dover Castle, 10th march 1917.

Taken to hospital in Malta for Pneumonia on 14th March 1917.

Then to Mellieha Hospital, Malta, 9th May 1917.

He was invalided back home to the UK by H.T. Huntspill on 11th July 1917.

 

He would finish out his service with the Labour Corps, likely due to his medical issues.